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SUPREME COURT
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STATE OF UTAH
JOHN LEACH,
Plaintiff and Respondent,

\
I

" vs "
I Case No.
N O R M A B. A N D E R S O N and
(
i3808
VALLEY BANK AND TRUST
I
COMPANY,
j
Defendants and Appellants. J

APPELLANTS' BRIEF

STATEMENT OF
T H E N A T U R E O F T H E CASE
This action was brought by the respondent-creditor against appellant-debtor and appellant-trustee
seeking to invalidate a trust agreement to satisfy a
judgment.
DISPOSITION IN L O W E R COURT
Although the lower court found that no fraud was
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involved. I t invalidated the trust agreement based on a
Utah statute and gave a judgment against appellants.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellants seek reversal of the judgment entered
in lower court.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
This case arises out of the efforts of the plaintiff
to collect on a judgment against the defendant, Norma
Anderson, from assets which were placed in trust with
defendant, Valley Bank and Trust Company. The
trust was created prior to the date of judgment and
prior to the transaction on which the judgment is based.
Plaintiff asserts that the trust is void under Utah statutes prohibiting conveyance of personal property in
trust to defeat the claims of creditors.
The facts center upon the execution of a promissory
note, which is Exhibit 1-P [R-140], by the Angi Corporation and payable to the plaintiff. The note was
signed by David B. Anderson, who is the son of defendant, Norma B. Anderson. Norma B. Anderson
also signed as guarantor. Angi Corporation defaulted
and the plaintiff obtained judgment against Norma B.
Anderson.
The promissory note was dated April 15, 1969.
Five months prior to that date, on November 12, 1968,
Norma B. Anderson created a trust with defendant,
Valley Bank and Trust Company. Mrs. Anderson's
purposes in creating the trust were twofold:
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1. Mrs. Anderson is unable to resist the demands of her son, who had a drinking problem,
and who caused her to invest in his improvident business ventures [R-158 and Findings
of Fact No. 2].
2. Mrs. Atnderson desired to protect her
other children and her estate and required professional management because of her improvidence and inexperience.
The Bank officer who counselled her in the preparation
of the trust and in many meetings prior thereto corroborated these reasons [R-180-85 et seq].
Plaintiff was unable to satisfy his judgment
against Norma B. Anderson's personal assets and he
brought this action to recover against the assets of the
trust.
The complaint is in two causes of action. The first
cause of action was based on the theory that defendant,
Norma B. Anderson, defrauded the plaintiff in relation
to the presentation of the July 1968 financial statement. Count I was dismissed by the court at the time
of trial as being without support in the evidence. The
court found that Mrs. Anderson had not given the
financial statement to the plaintiff and that it was taken
from her files without her knowledge. The promissory
note was dated April 15, 1969, approximately one year
after the date of the financial statement [July, 1968]
and the plaintiff made no effort to verify the facts contained in the statement to determine the accuracy thereof or to run any credit checks of any kind [R-148-151].
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Count I I is based upon the theory that the trust
is void as to the plaintiff under Section 25-1-11, Utah
Code Annotated, which declares void trusts of personal
property for the use of the trustor.
Rex Guymon, trust officer of the defendant Valley
Bank and Trust Company testified concerning the
trust, its assets, and payments from the trust. Mr. Guymon identified certain payments which had been made
to Norma B. Anderson averaging $928.54 per year
[R-1F6]. Mr. Guymon established that the payments
referred to were insignificant in proportion to the trust
assets and that on occassions Mrs. Anderson had requested other payments which had been refused [R182]. The only payment of any consequence - the
$5,000 paid to protect her interest in the Chuck Wagon
property — was in reality a payment made to conserve
the trust assets since the Chuck Wagon stock was also
conveyed to and became a part of the trust estate [R1F6].
ARGUMENT
POINT I
T H E S T A T U T E D O E S NOT VOID
TRUSTS IN W H I C H T H E TRUSTOR
IS M E R E L Y AN I N C I D E N T A L BENEFICIARY
Resolution of the plaintiff's claim requires careful
application of all of the terms employed by the statute.
The plaintiff cannot select those words which suit his
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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purpose and ignore other words which would preclude
his claim. Plainly the statute must be construed in siich
a way that each word is given its intended meaning, and
if that meaning is applied plaintiff's claim miist fail.
A. The statute applies only to trusts of personal
property.
By its own terms the statute applies onlj to "goods,
chattels, or things in action made in trust." An examination of the trust instrument, which is in evidence, and
the financial statement which the plaintiff claims misled
him, will reveal that, in the main, this trust is composed
of real property as to which the statute has no application whatsoever. The Utah Supreme Court has so held
in Geary v. Came, 71 Utah 268, 9 P . 2d 396, wherein
the court stated:
"She says that the conveyance. . . in which
he conveyed all of his property in this state to
the corporation, . . . without consideration,
comes squarely within the provisions of said
section. But such position cannot be maintained. Section 5816 relates only to transfers
of personal property, not real property, and
hence has no application to the conveyance of
the real estate here involved. I t relates only to
'goods, chattels, or things in action', which in
any sense of the terms are not real property."
Fhe financial statement [Exhibit 2] clearly shows
that almost all of the assets of any real or substantial
nature that were transferred to this trust are real estate
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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or interests in real estate. Therefore, in order to sustain
the District Court's decision, this Court will have to
directly overrule the case law in the State of Utah,
which represents the majority opinion in the United
States.
B. The purposes of Norma B. Anderson's
are not within the statute.

trust

Even if the trust assets were of the type contemplated by the statute, the statute declares that its provisions apply only to trusts "for the use of the person
making the same." The meaning of that phrase has never
been defined by the Utah Supreme Court and in that
sense this case is one of first impression. This Court
must therefore look to the general law on the subject
and the purposes of the statute itself.
As already noted, the statute is directed to the conveyances of personal property in such a way as to shield
them from "existing or subsequent creditors of such
person." I t is, in simple terms, a statute directed at
conveyances to defraud one's creditors. There is no evidence in this case that Mrs. Anderson had any such
purpose in mind or, that, viewed from the time of its
creation this trust would defraud creditors. In fact, the
only testimony on the subject is Norma Anderson's
statement that at the time of the conveyance she desired to protect herself from her son's improvidence,
protect the interests of her other children and obtain
good management of the assets. Mrs. Anderson further
testified that she had retained in her own possession
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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ample assets which she believed would satisfy all of her
known creditors as her claims matured:
tl

Q. Would you explain for the Court
the resons why you caused that trust instrument to be prepared and executed?
A. Well, I didn't seem to be able to refuse my son and he was wanting to open up so
many Chuck Wagons and I really didn't want
to get involved in them and I told him so but
he just kept after me and kept after me to get
money for this and money for that, to get into
more and more Chuck Wagons and so, of
course, my attorney wanted me to set up a
trust so that I could refuse him so that, you
know, I wouldn't - I couldn't go ahead and
hand the money over to him which I was doing
so that I could protect me and my children."
[R-158]
The testimony of Rex Guymon, the bank officer,
corroborated Mrs. Anderson's testimony and these facts
were never disputed:
"Q. (By Mr. Biele) Thank you. Would
you please state what she stated to you?
A. She said that her husband was killed
in an accident in 1967 and that she had considerable problems as far as managing her affairs
and needed administrative help from the bank
and indicated that one of the main reasons that
she wanted to set the trust up is to protect herself against an alcoholic son that was — that
was continually asking her for money and she
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could not refuse those requests and so the trust
consequently was set up under the advice of
her attorney after —
Q. Were there any statements made to
equalization of inheritance ?
A. Yes. That was another reason why
the trust was set up is because she had other
children and other heirs to her estate and the
way it was going her son, David, was receiving
a share that was not -- would not be equal to
the others and by putting it in an irrevocable
trust this would insure her that the other children would get their proportionate share." [R.
IF-4-5]
The true purpose of this trust, as is evident by its
provisions [R-8F-98] (which are their own best evidence), is to conserve Mrs. Anderson's estate for the
benefit of her children and grandchildren. This is evident from a reading of clauses I V and V of the trust,
which contain three pages of detailed directions concerning the distribution of trust assets to Mrs. Anderson's heirs. There are also provisions for the maintenance
of Mrs. Anderson during her life, but these are common
provisions in such an estate planning instrument and
could not be held to render the trust one "for the use"
of Mrs. Anderson, within the meaning of the statute.
C.

As a matter of law the statute does not apply.

What is more fundamental, however, is that the
purpose of this trust was not "for the use" of the trustor
within the meaning of that term in law.
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To adopt the plaintiff's construction of the statute
would mean that the settlor of a trust could never have
any beneficial interest, even as an incidental beneficiary,
or the entire trust instrument would fail. Not only is
that an unfair and unreasonable construction of a statute, the obvious purpose of which is to prevent fraud
of creditors, but neither is the construction that has been
placed on similar statutes in other jurisdictions.
Thus Restatement of Trusts, 2d § 114 declares that
the purpose of such statutes is to invalidate trusts which
are for the sole benefit of the trustor:
"§ll4.

The Settlor as Beneficiary

The Settlor of a trust may be one of the beneficiaries or the sole beneficiary of the trust
Illustrations
1. Statutes. In some states there are statutes
which provide that a transfer in trust for the
benefit of the settlor is void. Such statutes are
interpreted as sole benefit of the Settlor."
(Emphasis added.)
Such a construction is a sound one. Under any
other construction the careless slip of a draftsman's
pen (in which even a hypothetical interest of the settlor
was retained) would have the effect of invalidating the
entire trust. If this court were to adopt such a harsh
reading of the statute it would, in truth, invalidate the
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entire law of trusts. The extensive provisions of Utah
law relating to the creation and interpretation of trusts,
to which citations are necessary, attest that no such intention may be ascribed to the legislature.
POINT II
E V E N I F T H E C O U R T W E R E TO
DETERMINE THAT APPELLANT'S
T R U S T I S S U S C E P T I B L E TO T H E
C L A I M S , T H E R E S P O N D E N T CAN
ONLY REACH
THAT
AMOUNT
THAT THE TRUSTEE UNDER THE
TERMS OF T H E TRUST COULD P A Y
TO T H E A P P E L L A N T OR A P P L Y
FOR H E R B E N E F I T .
While the meaning and construction to be given
the statement in U C A 25-1-11 are not entirely clear,
the underlying ^policy is evident. Generally speaking,
it is against public policy to allow a person to create
for his own benefit an interest in property that cannot
be reached by his creditors. On the other hand, it is
equally evident that public policy would not permit
one's creditors to reach property in which the debtor
has no beneficial interest and is unable to use and enjoy.
Restatements of Trust 2d §156 states the general
rule:
"§156.
(2)

Where the Settlor is a Beneficiary.

Where a person creates for his own
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benefit a trust for support or a discretionary
trust, his transferee or creditors can reach the
maximum amount which the trustee under the
terms of the trust could pay to him or apply
for his benefit."
The Anderson trust is a combination support and
discretionary trust. Under the terms of the trust, the
trustee " shall pay to or for the benefit of the grantor
such portions of the income and principal of this trust
as may be necessary to maintain the grantor in a reasonable standard of living after taking into consideration
other income received by Grantor". I t is within the trustee's discretion to make payments "as may be necessary".
The Trustee's discretion is not absolute, however, Paragraph I I of the trust agreement goes on to provide a
guideline for the trustee in determining what is a reasonable standard of living. "In determining the standard
of living to be maintained, the trustee shall use as a rule
of guide the standard of living of the g<*rantor of the
date of the execution of this agreement..."
Applying the rule of §156(2) of the Restatement
the maximum trust assets respondent would be able
to reach would be the difference between the grantor's
income from other sources and the amount necessary to
maintain a standard of living comparable to that which
she enjoyed in November of 1968. Pursuant to the
statute, Respondent would only be able to reach "goods,
chattels, or things in action," in order to satisfy his claim.
Case law reinforces this portion. DiMaria v. Bank
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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of California National Association, 23 Cal. App. 2d
254, 46 Cal. Rptr. 924 (1965) involved a situation similar to the instant case. In each case a widow with grown
children has executed an irrevocable trust agreement
transferring most of her assets to a bank. I n each case
the purpose of the trust was to free the trustor from
the constant demands of her children. Each trust provided for certain distribution of the income to the trustor
during her lifetime and the remainder to be distributed
on her death to her children. Each provided that the
trustee could apply for the trustor's benefit so much
of the principal as the trustee deemed advisable if the
income from other sources, should be insufficient to
provide for the trustor's reasonable support. In the
DiMaria case, the trustee's discretion is absolute, while
as has been seen in the Anderson trust, the trustee's
discretion is limited by certain guidelines.
In a creditors suit to declare that the corpus of the
trust was subject to his claim, the court held the trustee
was justified in refusing to pay the creditor's claim from
the corpus of the trust in the absence of a showing under
the terms of the trust agreement that the settlor's income from the trust and other sources was not sufficient
for her reasonable support to authorize the exercise of
trustee's discretion in invading the corpus for the settlor's
benefit.
The court reasoned that to permit recovery from the
corpus without showing an inadequacy of the trustor's
income from other sources for her support would give
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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the creditor access to trust assets not reachable by the
beneficiary nor payable to her within the sound discretion of the trustor. At 926:
"The general rule is that the creditor of a
beneficiary under a trust has no more rights
and can secure no greater benefits from a trust
than the beneficiary himself."
The DiMaria court distinguished Ware v. Gulda,
331 Mars 68, H 7 N E 2d 137 (1954), and Greenwich
Trust Co. v. Tyson, 129 Conn. 211; 27A 2d 166 (1942);
on the grounds that they dealt with discretionary trusts
in which the income and/or principal was payable to
the settlor/beneficiary subject only to the absolute discretion of the trustee. The court pointed out that the
trustee's discretion over the payment of corpus is limited
rather than absoulte. "The corpus can be invaded only
if the income therefrom, together with Mrs. Walton's
income from other sources, is insufficient to provide
reasonable support, medical care and comfort. The discretion granted the trustee would clearly be abused by
any arbitrary withdrawal not justified under this proscription." At 926.
This holding should be applied to the facts of this
case. If the Anderson trust is found to be subject to
the respondent claims, the respondent may not receive
greater benefits than Mrs. Anderson herself. Therefore,
the Respondent would only be able to reach the amount
of personal property equal to that amount necessary
to maintain the standard of living which she was acDigitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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customed to in November 1968 minus the income Mrs.
Anderson receives from outside sources. I t is up to the
court to ascertain the amount of trust assets subject
to the respondents claim. Scott on Trusts §156. 1 p.
1197.
The Respondent may argue that the DiMaria case
is distinguishable from the present case in that the Walton trust did not contain a spendthrift provision and
California has not enacted a statute comparable to U C A
25-1-11. The fact that the Anderson trust contains a
spendthrift provision should not affect an application
of the holding in Dimaria to the facts of this case. Even
if the spendthrift clause is held to be illegal as against
the creditors of Mrs. Anderson, it has been held that
this does not affect the validity of the other provisions
of the trust. Liberty National Bank v. Hicks; 173 F2d
631 (1948), 9ACR 2d 1335.
The fact that there was no California statute similar to the Utah statute is not fatal to this case. UCA
25-1-11 deals with trusts "for the use of the maker." If
it is held that this statute is applicable to the trust in
question it may only be so as to the portions of the trust
that are "for the use of the maker". Any other reading
of the statute would serve to give the creditors of Mrs.
Anderson greater rights and benefits in the trust property than she has for herself. This is contrary to the
public policy underlying these statutes, Scott on Trust,
§156 p. 1192-93.
This is especially so considering that the domiDigitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

15
nating purpose behind the Anderson trust was not to
avoid Mrs. Anderson's just obligations but rather to
free herself from the constant demands of her son,
David, and guarantee her other children a fair share
of the estate she and her husband had developed over
the years.
Since the Court has personal jurisdiction of Mrs.
Anderson, it could order her, under pain of contempt
and possible imprisonment, to pay any sums paid to her
by the trustee to the creditor, and the court need not
upset or modify the provisions of the trust agreement
or change the law of many years standing.
POINT III
SINCE T H E G I F T WAS ABSOLUTE
AND T H E TRUST IRREVOCABLE,
IT VESTED INTERESTS IN CHILDREN AND GRANDCHILDREN AND
T H E SUSTAINING OF T H E DISTRICT COURT W O U L D D I V E S T
T H E S E PARTIES OF A VALUABLE
RIGHT WITHOUT HEARING.
Under the terms of the trust the proceeds are to
be distributed to the children, grandchildren and greatgrandchildren of Mrs. Anderson in accordance with
fixed and described formulas. The trust was irrevocable.
Mrs. Anderson retained no right to invade the trust
principal.
The trust creates a "grandchildren's trust" which
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is for the benefit of "all of the grandchildren of the
grantor, including such grandchildren as may be born
after the date of the establishment of the trust and until
final distribution of the trust portion" which occurs ten
(10) years after the last grandchild living at the date
of the establishment of the trust has attained the age of
twenty-two (22) years.
The grandchildren's trust provides for payments
for health, hospital, medical, dental expenses, for religious education, college or technical education. These interests are vested! The parties owning said interests
are not represented in this case. Is it the policy of the
court to take from yet unborn children or from parties
not represented before the court their vested interests?
Since this trust is for the benefit of many persons
other than Mrs. Anderson and would continue for many
years, it is obvious that the spendthrift provisions of
the trust, as they apply to children and to grandchildren,
are perfectly enforceable and realistic.
On the other hand, if any amount or benefit, as a
matter of right is payable to Mrs. Anderson, then such
amount, when payable, could be subject to the claims
of a creditor of Mrs. Anderson as the law prohibits
enforcement of a spendthrift provision in relation to the
person creating the trust. In this case, Mrs. Anderson
had no right to demand any funds. The method and
amount of payment is completely discretionary with
the trustee who can pay the same for her benefit or to
her as it, in its sole discretion, determines.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

17
P O I N T IV
T H E P L A I N T I F F S C L A I M I S BARR E D BY T H E S T A T U T E O F L I M I T A TIONS.
This trust was created on November 12, 1968. The
promissory note that gave rise to the action in this case
was dated April 15, 1969. The plaintiff's action to set
aside the trust was filed March 27, 1972, which is more
than three (3) years after the date of the creation of
the trust.
The applicable statute of limitations is 78-12-26:
"(4) An action for a liability created by
the statutes of this state, other than for a penalty or forfeiture under the laws of this state,
except where in special cases a different limitation is prescribed by the statutes of this
state."
Since the plaintiff's claim for relief in this action is
based on the Utah statute (25-1-11 UCA) and since
there is no tolling provision of the statute, this cause
of action by the plaintiff is barred. I t is interesting to
note that in the prior two subsections (2) (3), the legislature has deemed it provident to include tolling provisions that defer the running of the statute until a
party obtains knowledge of the claimed violation of the
statute. There is no tolling provision in subsection (4)!
The primary assets of the trust in this case consist
of real estate which was immediately transferred to the
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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trustee thereby, under Utah statutes, giving constructive
notice of the transfer. Any check of the records or review of the financial condition of the applicant would
disclose transfers to the trust. In this case the court
found, as a matter of fact, that there was no fraudulent
intent by Mrs. Anderson.
The case of Smith v. Edwards, 81 Utah 244, 17
P.2d 264, is on all fours with the case at hand, for, in
that case, as in this case, the court held that there was
no fraud shown and that the statute of limitations runs
from the time of recording of the conveyances, as all
persons are given notice by the recording. The court
stated:
"[12] . . . . From the time of recording
these conveyances all persons, including plaintiffs, notice was imparted to them that the conveyances contained the statements above
quoted. . . . "

••••** * •

"[20,21] We are of the opinion that the
action is barred under the statutes of limitations for the reason that discovery was made,
or the situation was such as to furnish full
opportunity for the discovery of fraud, if any
existed, more than three years before the bringing of the action. We are further of the opinion
there was no fraud shown. . ." (Emphasis
added.)
Since the Smith v. Edwards case is identical with
the case at hand, it is obvious that the same judgment
should apply and the Supreme Court should sustain its
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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prior order by determining that the statute of limitations has run and the action is barred.
POINT V
UNLESS T H E SETTLOR HAS T H E
" U S E " OR C O N T R O L O F T H E P R I N CIPAL, SUBSEQUENT CREDITORS
H A V E NO R I G H T TO S E T A S I D E
T H E T R U S T OR T H E CONVEYANCES TO T H E TRUST.
The Utah statute (25-1-11) states:
". . . All conveyances . . . made in trust for the
use of the person making the same shall be
void . . ."
In the present case the trust is only incidentally or
partially for the use of the grantor and primarily for
the fmmmtmxx 01 the estate and with instant vesting m
the beneficiaries of the trust.
The general rule in cases similar to the instant case
is stated in Stirlin v. Teschemacher, Missouri 64 S W
2d 647, 91 A L R 121:
". . . The general rule is that a subsequent
creditor will not be heard to complain about
what his debtor did with his property before
the accural of the indebtedness..."
This general proposition is affirmed in 37 Am J u r
2d, Sec. 28:
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". . . I n order that the transfer may be sustained as to subsequent creditors, it must
appear that the settlor has divested himself of
all rights of ownership in and control over the
property conveyed, reserving only to himself
the right to receive the income during life. . ."
"A statute providing that every conveyance
in trust to the use of the transferor shall be
void as against creditors does not invalidate
a conveyance of a remainder interest . . .
created in behalf of another."
Since the Court in this case has held that the trust
was created without any fraudulent intent, then the
almost universal rule is set forth in 93 A L R 1205-1212
wherein the cases hold that such a trust is valid against
subsequent creditors. The case of Merchantile Trust
Company v. Bergdorf and G. Cole 93 A L R 1205, 167
Md 158, 173 Atlantic 31 held that where a trust was
created without fradulent intent and with the net income payable to the settlor for life, cannot be subject
to the payment of the settlor's debts subsequently. In
93 A L R at page 1212 editors state :
" I t would seem that such a conveyance is not
invalid as to subsequent creditors if the remainder intef&st is not retained in the settlor but
*&<ra.iy a powe^pf^ppointment..."
In the instant case the grantor has not even reserved
the right of a power of appointment but has actually
and definitively vested all of the remainders. The editors
further states at page 12l3:
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". . . actual fraud of the settlor is generally
essential to the success of subsequent creditors
. . . citing many cases."
CONCLUSION
The settlor in this case, Norma B. Anderson, without any intent to defraud creditors but rather to provide
against her own improvidence and protect the rights
of her children and grandchildren in the estate that
had been created by her deceased husband, created a
trust. Mrs. Anderson reserved no right in herself or
control over the trust corpus. Further, Mrs. Anderson
is not even entitled to all of the income of the trust but
only to those funds necessary to maintain her standard
of living after taking into consideration other sources
of income. This trust is not solely for the use of the
grantor. I t is not created to defraud creditors. I t was
established so that Mrs. Anderson, during her lifetime,
would not become a dependent on society and her children would have a share in their father's estate. Mrs.
Anderson made no representations to the plaintiff. The
plaintiff made no effort to check the validity of any
representations or even to contact Mrs. Anderson and
yet he now seeks to take from her and her children and
grandchildren the security of this trust. ^ttMkfc*
i«H^iai*NpmJNMW^^
If the
court is to sustain the plaintiff in this case, it would make
it impossible for a person who is informed that he has
rapidly advancing "early senility" or "acute alcoholism"
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or other physical or emotional problem to place his assets
in such a condition that they would provide for him and
against the problems arising from his disease. Obviously,
it is not in the public interest to set aside this trust.
The implications of such a decision would cause a complete revolution in trust business and in the ability of a
free man to provide for himself and against the infirmities of time and disease.
Further, the plaintiff has slept on his rights and
the period of limitations allowed for the commencement
of any action has expired. This court must overrule
prior decisions in order to sustain this late filed action.
In addition, primary assets of this trust consist of
real estate and this court has held that the statute does
not apply to transfers of real estate in trust. To sustain
the plaintiff's cause in this case it must again overrule
a prior, well-founded decision which would have many
very serious implications, such as the affect on the Trust
Deed Act of the State of Utah, the affect on transfers
reserving life estates, etc.
The trust that44s subject to this action is only incidentally ajid partially; for the benefit of the trustor, and
the purposes of this trust are not within those prohibited
by the statute. This court has been consistent in following the recommendations as contained in the Restatement of Trusts and the Restatement recommendation
in this case is that "such statutes are interpreted as applicable only where the intended trust is for the sole
benefit of the settlor".
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This trust is not for the sole purpose of the settlor,
the statute of limitations has expired and the settlor,
the widow Mrs. Anderson, would be penalized for her
providence if the Supreme Court were to sustain the
action of the District Court. Therefore, your appellants
respectfully move the Court for its order reversing the
decision of the District Court in determining that the
Utah statute, Section 25-1-11 is not applicable to the
trust created under the circumstances in this case.
D A T E D this 3rd day of January, 1975.
Respectfully submitted,

By

IfiUb % \uJ^^
P A R K E R M. N I E L S O N
Attorney for Appellant,
Norma B. Anderson

L^&
I R W t f G H . B I E L E of
BIELE, HASLAM & HATCH
Attorney for Appellant,
Valley Bank and Trust Company
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